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We investigate the effect of health insurance on labor market transitions in and out of self-
employment as well as on the likelihood of being self-employed. We consider the role of 
individual health insurance coverage along with that from a spouse. Next, we examine a 
series of tax deductions granted to the self-employed through amendments made to the 1986 
Tax Reform Act. Using data from the Current Population Survey for 1996-2007, we find 
significant but small effects of the after-tax health insurance premium on the entry rate, with 
no effect on exits from self-employment or the likelihood of being self-employed. 
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The link between health insurance and wage/salary employment in the U.S. has received
considerable attention in the popular press and in the economics literature. Traditionally in the
U.S., insurance has been tied to full-time wage/salary employment, although recent debates
have centered on possible modications to this relationship. This link has arisen for a variety of
reasons including: 1) the nature of the U.S. tax system; 2) the economies of scale achieved when
insurance is sold to rms due to better risk-pooling opportunities and lower administrative costs
per subscriber; 3) the reduction in moral hazard resulting from the provision of benets in the
form of services, as opposed to cash indemnities; and 4) the alleviation of adverse selection
again due to risk-pooling among employees.
According to estimates from the Kaiser Family Foundation that use data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS), the overwhelming majority (61 percent) of non-elderly Americans
receive health insurance (HI) through their employer or their spouse's employer (KFF, 2007).
Since coverage is often linked to full-time wage/salary (WS) employment, a larger fraction of
the self-employed (SE) are uninsured. About 28 percent of SE persons were estimated to be
without HI in 2006, while only 16 percent of full-time WS workers lacked coverage (KFF, 2007).1
The literature on health insurance has largely overlooked the possibility that the present health
care system in the U.S. may have implications for entrepreneurial activity. The role of such
activity in a capitalist economy is vital as it is often credited with encouraging competition,
introducing new ideas and technology, and creating jobs (Moore, 2003). Our paper serves as
one of the rst attempts in quantifying the importance of HI for entrepreneurship.
Primarily, the economics literature on this topic has sought to determine whether there
is any \job-lock" and if so, how much. Job-lock occurs when a WS worker is locked into a job
for fear of losing his employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI). This may lead to reduced job
search, and hence labor market ineciencies may occur. Beginning in the 1980s, attempts were
made to address such potential ineciencies and various pieces of legislation were passed, most
notably the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA86), the 1986 Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation
1Although the current discussion has focused on those Americans lacking HI, the inherent dierences between
these groups in terms of their risk attitudes could also lead to discrepancies in their demand for HI. Furthermore,
research has shown that the SE do not necessarily have worse health outcomes when compared to their WS
counterparts (Perry and Rosen, 2004).
1Act (COBRA), and the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
Madrian's (1994) seminal work was motivated by the passage of COBRA and addressed whether
job turnover was aected by the possible loss of ESI. Madrian (1994), along with and Gruber
and Madrian (1994), Adams (2004), and Monheit and Cooper (1994) to a lesser extent, nd
evidence of job-lock using various data sets over a series of years.
On the other hand, others such as Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Kapur (1998) nd no such
evidence. Gilleskie and Lutz (2002) nd none for married men, but a small eect for unmarried
men. Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) provide evidence of job-lock for married women, but
not for married men. When considering the two primary consequences of job-lock, namely
employment duration and wages, Berger et al. (2004) do not nd it to be statistically signicant.
Anderson (1997) contributes about half of the decline in the average mobility rates (20-40
percent) to \job-push" instead of job-lock. Job-push occurs when an employee is pushed out
of a job because he/she is in need of HI. All of these papers on job-lock attempt to identify the
role of HI in explaining workers' job turnover rates by exploiting variation in cost factors that
lead to dierences in individuals' valuation of ESI. While variation in alternative sources of
HI coverage, primarily that from a spouse, has been the most common empirical identication
strategy pursued, family size, pregnancies, and health conditions have also been used as cost
factors.2
This paper investigates the role of HI in explaining labor market transitions with a
special emphasis on the SE. We rst focus on labor market transitions from WS employment
into SE and then on exits from SE into WS jobs. To this end, we begin by following the job-
lock literature (e.g., Madrian, 1994; Buchmueller and Valetta, 1996) by exploiting variation
in individual and spousal HI. In addition, a series of changes in the tax deductions oered
to the SE for HI purchases provide us with a unique opportunity to exploit an exogenous
source of identication. The original TRA86 allowed the SE to deduct 25 percent of their
HI premium (i.e. own, spouse, and dependents) from their taxable income.3 Between 1996
2See Gruber and Madrian (2004) for an overview of this literature and the various identication strategies
used.
3Previously, the 1942 Stabilization Act and the 1954 Internal Revenue Code granted the same rights to
employers and employees for their individual contributions to their employees plans. See Thomasson (2002;
2003) for a history of the evolution of the American HI market. Note that the tax exclusions oered to the SE
only reduce income taxes, while those extended to ESI reduce both income and payroll taxes.
2and 2003, a series of amendments were made to the TRA86 which gradually increased the
deduction to 100 percent. Gumus and Regan (2008) study the TRA86 amendments in the
context of the demand for HI as a policyholder, for both men and women. Their estimates
of the price elasticity of demand suggest that this series of tax deductions did not provide
sucient incentives for SE entrepreneurs to obtain coverage. In light of these ndings, we
analyze whether the TRA86 amendments improved the chances of entrepreneurial entry and
survival, as well as the likelihood of being SE, despite their ineectiveness in encouraging
previously uninsured SE individuals to purchase HI.
As mentioned, the literature relating HI availability to SE is somewhat limited, but
some notable exceptions exist. A few papers have examined the role of alternative sources
of coverage by focusing on married couples. The ndings on this topic are somewhat mixed,
however. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996) nd that spousal HI coverage encourages transitions into
entrepreneurship while the lack of HI portability does not in
uence such transitions. Lombard
(2001) nds that access to a spouse's HI plan increases the likelihood that a married woman
chooses SE over WS employment. Wellington (2001) also nds positive eects of spousal HI on
the likelihood of being SE; these eects are larger for husbands than for wives. Recently, Fairlie
et al. (2008) estimate a so-called \entrepreneurship lock" using data from the CPS and nd a
large negative eect of ESI plans on the probability of entrepreneurship. They show that these
eects are even larger for those without any spousal coverage than for those with spousal HI.
They also provide evidence that Medicare eligibility may improve business ownership among
older workers. Conversely, Bruce et al. (2000) nd little impact of the portability of ESI on the
transition into SE among older workers. Finally, DeCicca (2007) studies the impact of the 1993
New Jersey Individual Health Coverage Plan (IHCP) on the probability of being SE. The IHCP
was designed to facilitate access to HI that was not employer-linked nor employer-sponsored.
By comparing residents of New Jersey to those of Pennsylvania, he constructs a series of
dierence-in-dierences (DD) estimates and nds that the IHCP did encourage individuals to
become SE.
There are a few recent papers that have focused specically on the eect of the TRA86
and its amendments in explaining SE decisions.4 Gurley-Calvez (2006) studies the original
4There are a select few other papers that have addressed other changes in the tax code, not related to HI
deductibility, and how they aect SE decisions. For example, Gentry and Hubbard (2000), Bruce (2002), Moore
3TRA86 using data on tax records and nds positive (negative) eects of the mandated 25
percent tax deduction on entrepreneurial survival (exit). Velamuri (2008) also focuses on the
original TRA86 to determine whether the 25 percent tax deduction encouraged more women
without access to spousal HI to become SE. Using data from the CPS, she nds that the rate of
SE among such women did in fact increase in the post-TRA86 era (i.e. 1990-1991). Heim and
Lurie (2008) examine the amendments made to the TRA86, which increased the deductibility
of HI premiums from 60 percent in 1999, to 70 percent in 2002, and to 100 percent in 2003 for
the SE. Using a panel of tax returns, they investigate how these changes aected the probability
of being SE, becoming SE, and exiting SE. They nd that a decline in the after-tax price of
HI for the SE increases the likelihood of being SE and the likelihood of entering SE with no
statistically signicant eect on rates of exit.5
We use data from the 1996-2007 March Supplements of the CPS to analyze the role
of HI on SE. We exploit the longitudinal feature of the CPS and construct a panel using
the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) series which is composed of two-year cross-sections to
investigate labor market transitions. The analysis is performed for prime-age (i.e. ages 25-60)
working men. First, we construct a series of DD estimates from probit models which focus on
the eect of individual and spousal HI and their interaction. The estimated marginal eect on
the interaction term between individual and spousal coverage is the DD estimator and has the
expected positive sign in both entry and exit probit equations. However, it is only statistically
signicant in the model of entry. A second set of probit models is estimated that exploit the
exogenous variation in the relative after-tax HI premium (SE versus WS) due to the changes in
the TRA86 tax deductions. For this purpose, we consider the amendments made to the TRA86
that gradually increased the initial 25 percent deduction to 100 percent in 2003. On average,
we nd that an increase of about 15 percent in this price ratio decreases the rate of entry by 3.7
percent. On the other hand, the eect on exit rates is statistically insignicant. For our nal
(2003), Bruce and Gurley (2005), and Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2007, 2008) focus on the relationship between
marginal tax rates (MTRs) and average tax rates (ATRs) and entrepreneurial duration, entry, and exit.
5The advantages of using tax records are that one can identify the amount of the HI premium deducted and
it is easier to dene SE based on the amount of reported SE income. In fact, several papers (e.g., Holtz-Eakin
et al., 1996; Gruber and Madrian, 2004; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; 2008) discuss the diculties associated with
dening SE/entrepreneurship in survey data. The drawback of using tax records, however, is that they include
very limited information in terms of individual, family, and job characteristics.
4exercise, we estimate a random-eects probit model corresponding to the likelihood of being
SE and nd no signicant eect of the relative after-tax HI premium.
This paper proceeds in the following manner: Section 2 outlines the empirical framework.
Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5
concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework and Empirical Specication
This paper investigates the role of HI coverage in explaining entrepreneurship and the
related labor market transitions. First, we begin by examining the role HI plays in explaining
entry from WS employment into SE, second in the decision to exit SE into WS jobs, and nally
on the likelihood of being SE. We start by considering how variations in sources of coverage,
namely individual and spousal, aect such decisions. Next, we consider whether the increasing
generosity of the TRA86 tax deductions, in terms of their eect on the relative after-tax HI
premium between the SE and the WS, in
uenced entry and exit rates as well as the average
rate of SE among prime-age working men.
2.1 Estimates using individual and spousal health insurance
To begin, we borrow from Madrian's (1994) seminal work and focus on variation in
individual and spousal HI in explaining labor market transitions. In order to examine the
impact of ESI on job mobility, Madrian (1994) measures the rate of turnover for married men,
with and without ESI, whose spouses may or may not have HI. We too begin by examining
these alternative sources of coverage for men, starting with the decision to enter SE from WS
employment. We estimate the following probit regression of one-year labor market transitions
for the WS men:
Entryi;t+1 = 1OwnHIit + 2SpHIit + 3(OwnHIit  SpHIit)
+Xit + IMRWSit + Y earit + Stateit + "it; (1)
where Entry is an indicator that takes a value of \1" if the individual i enters SE in year t+1
and a value of \0" if a he remains as a WS worker. OwnHI takes on a value of \1" if the
WS worker is the policyholder of his own ESI and a value of \0" otherwise. SpHI indicates
5whether the spouse is the policyholder of her own ESI plan. X is a vector of individual, family,
and job characteristics, as well as a constant term. IMRWS is the inverse Mills' ratio which
corrects for the initial conditions bias, as explained in the next paragraph. Y ear is the set of
year dummies, State is a vector of state dummies, and " is the error term which we assume is
normally distributed. The DD estimate corresponds to the marginal eect on the interaction
term. Madrian (1994), among others who examine job-lock, gauge the eect of individual
HI between a control and an experimental group. Similarly in our case, we assess how the
treatment, i.e. being the policyholder of one's own HI plan, varies between those with access
to spousal HI and those without. If we can extend the arguments postulated by the job-lock
literature, a WS worker with ESI is less likely to leave his WS job (i.e. he is more job-locked)
and seek SE, all else equal. This eect is presumably even more pronounced for those whose
spouses do not have their own ESI. Thus, we expect the marginal eect associated with 1 to
be negative and that associated with 3 to be positive.6
In order for an individual to be in our sample, when we estimate the likelihood of entry
into SE, he must be WS in period t|i.e. those who were already SE in t are excluded from the
analysis. We are unable to observe the transitions into SE that occurred before or after our
period of analysis and thus we have a selected sample. Following Bruce (2000), we correct for
this \initial conditions bias" by rst estimating a probit model where the dependent variable
takes on a value of \1" if the man is rst observed in a WS job and \0" if he is instead SE.
The regressors in this rst-stage estimation include the individual and family characteristics
along with the state and year dummies. As in Bruce (2000), identication is achieved through
a veteran status regressor.7 The resulting estimated inverse Mills' ratio (IMRWS) is then
included as a regressor in the second-stage probit.
Next, we estimate another DD model corresponding to the likelihood of exit from SE
6Ai and Norton (2003) discuss the problems associated with calculating the marginal eects and the statistical
signicance for the interaction terms in non-linear models. They suggest a correction for obtaining the marginal
eect on the interaction terms which requires calculating the entire cross-derivative. A recent paper by Puhani
(2008) challenges these assertions, however. Table 5 reports both the regular marginal eects [in brackets] and
those obtained using the Ai and Norton (2003) method fin bracesg associated with the interaction terms. Both
turn out to be identical in terms of statistical signicance and very similar in magnitude. Therefore, in what
follows, we refer to the gures reported in brackets only.
7The results to this exercise can be obtained from the authors upon request.
6into WS jobs using a framework similar to that above:
Exiti;t+1 = 1OwnHIit + 2SpHIit + 3(OwnHIit  SpHIit)
+Xit + IMRSEit + Y earit + Stateit + "it: (2)
The primary dierence between equations (1) and (2) is the dependent variable: Exit is an
indicator which takes a value of \1" if an entrepreneur exits SE and takes a WS job. If instead
he chooses to remain SE, it takes on a value of \0." The IMRSE in this specication now
corresponds to the rst-stage probit which corrects for the fact that we have a selected sample
of individuals|i.e. those who were SE in period t. Again, we compare the eect of OwnHI
between a control and an experimental group which are dened by SpHI. The DD estimate
is the marginal eect associated with the interaction between OwnHI and SpHI. In order
to obtain coverage as a policyholder, SE individuals must purchase HI in the private non-
group market. Rates are much higher in this market for reasons explained in the introduction.
Additionally, individuals incur search costs and run the risk of being denied coverage for pre-
existing conditions. Therefore, having HI coverage as a SE individual, at least to some extent,
may be merely proxying for success as an entrepreneur. If individuals are discouraged from
switching jobs if they have HI, an uninsured entrepreneur is more likely to exit SE and seek a
WS job where he will be likely oered ESI. This is especially the case for those whose spouses
do not have their own ESI. Thus, we would again expect the marginal eect associated with
1 to be negative and that of 3 to be positive.
2.2 Estimates using the TRA86 amendments
It is dicult to argue that variations in an individual's HI status are orthogonal to those
of his spouse. In attempts to circumvent such endogeneity issues, the job-lock literature has
also focused on other cost factors based on an individual's, or his family's, health status and/or
medical expenditures. However, there are problems associated with these latter identication
strategies too, as discussed by Gruber and Madrian (2004). In light of these concerns, we pursue
a second identication strategy where we exploit the exogenous variations in the increasingly
generous HI tax deductions aorded by the TRA86 amendments. Prior to passage of the
original TRA86, the SE who did not itemize their income tax deductions, paid for their HI
with after-tax dollars. The original TRA86-mandated tax deduction was temporary and set
7to expire in 1992. The deduction was made retroactive, however, for persons who led an
amended return, and were made permanent in 1996. The Small Business Job Protection Act
of 1996 established a schedule that would increase this deduction to 80 percent by 2007. The
schedule was actually accelerated twice through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the Tax
and Trade Extension Relief Act of 1998. Through these series of amendments, the initial 25
percent TRA86 tax deduction was increased to 30, 40, 45, 60, 70, and 100 percent in 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, and 2003, respectively. Eligibility is restricted to SE individuals who
are the single owners of unincorporated businesses, with positive net prots, and who do not
have access to ESI.
The TRA86 amendments introduced exogenous changes in the price of HI for the SE
relative to that the WS face. We empirically examine one-year labor market transitions using
the following probit regression beginning with the decision to enter SE:
Entryi;t+1 = RelPremi;t+1 + Xit + IMRWSit + Y earit + Stateit + it; (3)
where Entry, IMRWS, Y ear, State, i, and t are dened as previously. RelPrem refers to the
predicted after-tax HI premium a worker would face if he chose to become SE in period t + 1
divided by the value if he instead remained WS (i.e. PSE
PWS). In the next section, we explain
how we calculate the premiums individuals face in each of these two employment states. To
the extent that the more generous TRA86 tax deductions lowered the relative price of HI for
the SE, we would expect  to be negative, holding everything else constant. X also includes
an individual's predicted relative earnings. This is the ratio of earnings predicted for period
t + 1 if an individual were to switch into SE relative to those he would receive if instead he
remained WS. We follow Bruce (2000) in predicting an individual's t + 1 earnings based on a
set of controls.8 The coecient estimates from these regressions are used to predict the period
t + 1 earnings for our sample of men if they were to become SE or if they instead chose to
remain in WS jobs.
The empirical framework we use to examine the eect of the relative after-tax HI premium
on exits from SE into WS jobs is as follows:
Exiti;t+1 = RelPremi;t+1 + Xit + IMRSEit + Y earit + Stateit + it: (4)
8The results to this exercise can be obtained from the authors upon request.
8All the explanatory variables are dened as in equation (3). We would expect the estimated co-
ecient on RelPrem to be positive: as the relative after-tax price of health insurance increases,
the rate of exit from SE would increase.
As a nal exercise, we estimate a random-eects probit regression which addresses the
likelihood of being SE for our entire sample by focusing on the eect of the relative after-tax
HI premium:
SEi;t = RelPremi;t+1 + Xit + Y earit + Stateit + i + it; (5)
where SE is an indicator for being SE; everything else is dened as before. The error term
is now composed of two parts: the individual-specic time-invariant random eect () which
captures the unobserved individual heterogeneity while the error term () is assumed to be
independent and identically distributed with a zero mean and a nite variance. Thus, the
random-eects probit controls for unobserved individual heterogeneity that is not captured by
a standard probit regression. We expect  to be negative in this model.9
3 Data
The data used in this paper come from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS
is a monthly survey sponsored by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Each month the CPS surveys some 50,000 households (\occupied units") and is designed to
represent the U.S. civilian, non-institutionalized population.10 Respondents are asked questions
about themselves and persons in the household who are ages 16 and above. The questions
center on demographic characteristics and labor market activities but include other annual
supplementary information as well (e.g., health insurance, tobacco use, computer ownership,
etc.). This study uses data from the 1996-2007 CPS March supplements; the 1996 survey was
the rst year in which detailed questions concerning the source of HI coverage were asked.
Because the labor market and HI status questions are retrospective with respect to the last
calendar year, the data covers 1995-2006.
9Note that one can also estimate a random-eects probit regression where the dependent variable is either
the entry or exit, as done in several papers (e.g., Madrian, 1994; Bruce, 2000). However, given the short nature
of the ORG panel, we only observe at most one transition per individual in our two-year panel. Hence, we are
unable to carry out such an exercise.
10Beginning in July 2001, the sample size increased to 60,000 occupied households.
9The CPS uses a 4-8-4 sampling scheme meaning that each household is in the survey for
four consecutive months, out for the next eight, and then returns for the following four months.
This survey design creates a longitudinal, albeit short, component called the Outgoing Rota-
tion Group (ORG). The two-year panel is created by matching ORGs between consecutive
survey years.11 In a given survey, individuals are uniquely identied by two variables: a house-
hold identier (HHID) and an individual line number within the household (LINENO). Across
surveys, one needs to supplement these two variables with others in order to match individ-
uals over time. Following Madrian and Lefgren (2000), we use gender, race, age, educational
attainment, and foreign birth status to obtain a good match.
The analysis in this paper focuses on prime-age (ages 25-60) working (either WS or SE)
men. In dening one's labor market status we considered the longest job held within the past
year. This accords with the HI variables which are also retrospective with respect to the last
calendar year. We consider individuals to be SE if they report SE as the longest job held within
the past year and if their enterprise is unincorporated. For the empirical analysis, we exclude
individuals who were working in agriculture, disabled, full-time students, in the Armed Forces
as well as those who were unemployed or not in the labor force. The CPS HI questions are
asked once a year in March and refer to coverage at any time during the previous calendar
year. The CPS contains information on coverage from the following sources: 1) a private plan
purchased through an employer (either as a policyholder or as a dependent); 2) a private plan
purchased directly (either as a policyholder or as a dependent); 3) a private plan provided
by someone outside of the household; 4) Medicare; 5) Medicaid; or 6) another type of plan
(i.e. state-only plan, Military Health plan, and Indian Health Service).12 In our analyses, the
variable OwnHI refers to category 1 if an individual is originally in WS employment and to
category 2 if the individual is SE in period t.
The primary variable of interest, in addition to individual and spousal HI policy holding
status, is the relative after-tax HI premium. We obtain average individual premium gures
using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component (MEPS-IC). The Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) make available annual tables from the MEPS-IC
corresponding to 1996-2006 which list the average individual premiums per enrolled employee
11For the 12-year period we consider, more than a third of the individuals are in ORG.
12Note that these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
10at private-sector establishments that oer HI. The gures are provided for each state and vary
by rm size. For WS employees, we use the overall rm averages, by state and by year. The
AHRQ's MEPS does not have similar information for privately purchased non-group plans.
In fact, obtaining meaningful and reliable average premium gures for individually purchased
plans from any source is nearly impossible.13 Since no reliable estimates exist, we proxy the
premium of a plan purchased in the private non-group market with the MEPS-IC gures
corresponding to rms employing less than 10 employees. These premiums re
ect the best
proxy for what a SE individual would face in the market for non-group HI.
Following Gruber and Poterba (1994), the after-tax HI premiums predicted for period
t + 1 are calculated as follows:




PWS = It+1  (1   t+1) if WS in t + 1
PSE = Tt+1  (1   max(;TRAt+1)t+1) if SE in t + 1,
(6)
where I is the employee's contribution to his HI plan and T is the total HI premium which
represents both the employee's and the employer's contribution to the plan.14  is the fraction of
the HI cost that can be claimed as an itemized deduction on one's income tax return.Individuals
(both WS and SE) are allowed to deduct their HI premiums from their taxable income as long as
the cost, together with other eligible medical care expenditures, constitute at least 7.5 percent
of their adjusted gross income (AGI).  is the individual's MTR on his predicted earned income
which in part determines the value of the tax deduction. Clearly, the tax incentives are greater
for those individuals at higher MTRs. We estimated the MTRs using the NBER's TAXSIM
program. This program calculates individuals' MTRs using information reported on their tax
returns including the tax year, state of residence, marital status, exemptions, various sources
of income and transfers.15 TRAt is the deduction rate allowed by the TRA86 in each year
(e.g., TRA1996 = 0:3).
13MEPS has a Household Component (MEPS-HC) which is a survey of individuals and families. The MEPS-
HC asks the respondents, who report having coverage from an individual policy, what their out-of-pocket pre-
miums are. This is a very small sample and hence cannot provide reliable summary statistics at the state-level
for each year between 1995 and 2006.
14Note that this may not re
ect the true cost of ESI due to the possible substitution between wages and
fringe benets (Levy, 1998; 2006) and the fact that some employees working for small rms are not able to pay
for their premiums with pre-tax dollars (Gruber and McKnight, 2003).
15For more information on TAXSIM, see www.nber.org/taxsim or Feenberg and Coutts (1993).
11The controls for the individual characteristics used in the analysis include age, its square,
race (white, Black, and other), and ethnicity (Hispanic and other). We also control for whether
an individual was born abroad. We include the following levels of completed schooling: high
school graduate, some college, college degree, or advanced degree. Those with less than a
high school degree are the omitted category. For the family characteristics, we include marital
status and the number of children under age 18. Following Fairlie et al. (2008), we control
for whether an individual owns his home along with his real interest, dividend, and rental
income as measures of wealth. The job characteristics include controls for the major industry
(mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, trades, nancial, services, and public
sector) and occupation (managerial, professional specialty, sales, technical and administrative
support, service, and blue collar) categories.
4 Results
Figure 1 shows the rate of SE, among working men, and the relative after-tax HI premium
for 1995-2006. The TRA86 tax deductions in each year are listed at the bottom of the gure.
The rate of SE averages about 7.5 percent during this period and the after-tax price of privately
purchased non-group HI is about seven times that of group HI. Figure 2 shows the transitions
in and out of SE for the same period. The average rate of entry from WS jobs into SE is 2.4
percent and the fraction of SE men who exit into WS jobs is about 29 percent. Overall, the
entry and exit rates seem relatively stable over the period we consider. Additional evidence
provided by Gumus and Regan (2008) shows that the composition of the WS and SE groups
also remained generally unchanged over this timeframe. Tables 1a and 1b provide the entry
and exit gures according to an individual's own or his spouse's HI status for the originally
WS and SE men, respectively. Considering the one-year transitions during the period of our
analysis, a larger fraction of the WS men who were not ESI policyholders entered SE (5.9
versus 1.3 percent). Similarly, a larger fraction of the SE men who were the policyholder of
their own privately purchased HI plan were more likely to remain SE than to exit into WS jobs
(75.3 versus 69.4 percent). For SE men, having a spouse who is the policyholder of her own
ESI seems to enable them to remain SE (74.0 versus 69.1 percent).
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the men who were WS at the baseline (i.e.
12in period t). The rst two columns present the gures for the overall sample while the next four
columns divide the sample into those who remain WS and those who enter SE in period t+1.
The last column provides the p-value for the t-test of statistically signicant dierences between
these two subgroups. On average, those who enter SE are slightly older, more likely to be white
and born abroad. Those who enter SE are more likely to be at the tails of the educational
attainment distribution|having either not completed high school or having instead earned a
graduate degree. There are also statistically signicant dierences in the industries in which
the WS men were originally employed as well as their income from interest and rentals.
The overwhelming majority, 74.7 percent, of the sample indicates being in very good
or excellent health, likely because we focus on prime-age working men who are not disabled.
There are no dierences between those who enter SE and those who remain WS in terms of
their health status. For the entire sample of WS men, on average 75 percent report being the
policyholder of ESI. This gure drops to 39.4 percent when we consider those who enter SE.
The average annual after-tax price of HI for SE men, which re
ects the TRA86 tax deductions,
is $2,971.16 Comparatively, this gure is $463 for WS men. Thus, the average relative after-tax
HI premium is 6.8. Concerning the wives of the married WS men, 4.5, 74.7, and 20.8 percent
are themselves SE, WS, and not working (NW), respectively. There seems to be evidence of
assortive mating as the fraction of wives that is SE is larger for those men who enter SE.
Overall, 37.6 percent of the married WS men have spouses who are the policyholders of their
own ESI. Perhaps not surprising, this gure is larger for men who enter SE rather than for
those who remain WS (45.3 and 37.4 percent, respectively).
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for those who were instead SE at the baseline.
Again, the rst two columns present the gures for the overall sample, while the next four
columns divide the sample according to those who remained SE versus those who exited into
WS jobs in period t+1. The results somewhat echo the ndings from above. On average, those
who remain in SE tend to be older. Blacks, Hispanics, those born outside of the U.S., and those
with more education are more likely to exit into WS employment. This latter nding could be
due to the fact that traditionally, WS jobs tend to value and reward formal education more
highly than do SE enterprises, which is consistent with the signaling hypothesis of education.
Those who exit into WS jobs are less likely to be married and to own their home. On average
16All dollar gures are expressed in constant 2006 US$ throughout the text and in the tables.
1317.3, 62.4, and 20.3 percent of the wives of married SE men are SE, WS, and NW, respectively.
It is interesting to note that a larger fraction of the married men who exit into WS employment
have spouses who are NW. Overall, 44.8 percent of the wives are the policyholders of ESI; this
gure is higher for those men who remain SE than for those who exit into WS jobs (46.4 versus
40.7 percent). There are again statistically signicant dierences between the groups in terms
of industry and occupation in which they worked at the baseline. More importantly there are
noticeable dierences in the fraction of men who are the policyholders of a privately purchased
HI plan. On average, 24.9 percent of those who remain SE report being the policyholders of a
private HI plan, whereas the corresponding gure is 19.8 percent for those who exit into WS
jobs.
Table 4 presents summary statistics at the baseline for all working men, both WS and
SE in our ORG sample. The rst two columns correspond to the entire sample, the next two
columns refer to those who are WS, and the nal two columns refer to the SE. Overall, 7.5
percent of the men are SE. On average, the SE men tend to be older, white, less educated, and
more likely to be married. They are more likely to own their home and to have higher levels of
rental income. About 45 percent of the SE men are married to a wife who is the policyholder
of her own ESI; this gure is about 38 percent for the WS men. Nearly three-quarters of the
men report being in excellent or very good health, and there are no statistically signicant
dierences between those who are WS and those who are SE.
The estimates of the entry and exit probit equations can be found in Tables 5 and 6;
Table 6 also includes the results from the random-eects probit model. The tables present
the coecient estimates, standard errors, and marginal eects. For presentation purposes, the
estimated eects on the year, state, industry, and occupation dummies have been suppressed.
Table 5 presents the estimated eects of individual and spousal HI on the decision to enter/exit
SE. The rst three columns provide the estimates of the entry equation (1) while the last three
columns correspond to the exit equation (2). For both analyses, we consider three samples: all
men, married men, and married men in dual-earner families. A dual-earner family is one in
which both the husband and wife are working. A possible problem with including all men in
our sample is that SpHI takes on the value of \0" for single men along with men whose wives
are NW, working part-time, or are not policyholders of ESI. As pointed out by Kapur (1998),
this non-comparability between the experimental and control groups may lead to inconsistent
14estimates. Thus, in our eorts to make these groups more comparable we divide the sample
according to marital status.
We begin by considering all men in WS jobs in period t (Table 5, column 1); the sample
size is nearly 70,000 persons. The individual and family characteristics that are statistically
signicant can be summarized as follows: individuals are more likely to enter SE if they are
white, born abroad, more educated, and have higher interest income. The inverse Mills' ratio
is statistically signicant suggesting that it is important to correct for the initial conditions
bias in these regressions. The estimated coecient on OwnHI is negative and statistically
signicant. Its marginal eect implies that a WS worker is 5.4 percentage points less likely to
enter SE if he is the policyholder of ESI, all else being equal. Similarly, the estimated coecient
on SpHI is negative and is also statistically signicant. Its marginal eect suggests that the
probability of entry is 0.9 percentage points lower when a WS man is married to a wife who is
the policyholder of her own ESI. This possibly hints at the unobserved family characteristics
in which both adults have their own ESI which is negatively related to the likelihood of entry.
Both of these marginal eects are quite large since the average rate of entry for this sample is
2.4 percent.
The variable of interest is the interaction term between individual and spousal ESI. As
expected, this term is positive and statistically signicant. The positive sign on the interaction
term indicates that the negative eect of OwnHI on entry into SE is smaller, in absolute value,
for men whose wives have ESI than for those whose wives do not have ESI. The na ve estimate
of the eect of own ESI on entry into SE is the marginal eect associated with 1. A corrected
estimate can be obtained by summing the marginal eects associated with 2 and 3.17 The
corrected DD estimate reveals a 0.44 percentage point decline in the average rate of entry. This
implies that having own ESI reduces the probability of entry into SE by 18.2 percent given
that the average rate of entry is 2.42 percent. Note that this eect is much smaller than the
na ve estimate of OwnHI.
The second and third columns of Table 5 present the probit estimates of equation (1) for
men who are married and for those who are married and in a dual-earner family, respectively.
These specications additionally control for whether the spouse is SE or WS (relative to NW).
17This corrected estimate is derived by comparing how the eect of own ESI status varies between WS men
whose wives have ESI and those whose wives do not, i.e. (1 + 2 + 3)   (1 + 0 + 0).
15For the for dual-earners, we control for whether the wife is SE (relative to WS). Bruce (1999)
cites two other reasons, besides assortive mating, why a husband's SE status could in
uence his
wife's entry into SE. These include the formation of a family business and the intra-family 
ows
of human and nancial capital. He nds that having a husband with exposure to SE nearly
doubles the probability that a woman enters SE, with the eects being most pronounced if
the husband is actually SE at the time of the transition. Similarly, we nd that the estimated
coecient associated with having a wife who is SE (WS) is positive (negative) and statistically
signicant.
The estimated coecients and marginal eects for the variables of interest in columns 2
and 3 are similar to those in column 1 in terms of sign, statistical signicance, and magnitude.
For married men (in dual-earner families) the marginal eect on OwnHI suggests that they are
5.9 (5.4) percentage points less likely to enter SE if they are the policyholders of ESI. As before
the corresponding marginal eect on SpHI is smaller and suggests a 0.8 (0.7) percentage point
reduction. Again, the estimated interaction term is positive and statistically signicant. For the
subsample of married men in WS employment, the corrected DD estimate is 0.81 percentage
points, which suggests that being the policyholder of an individual's own ESI plan reduces
the probability of entry into SE by 33.7 percent. This is based on the average rate of entry
which is 2.4 percent for this subsample. Further restricting the sample to those married men
in dual-earner families yields a corrected DD estimate that is smaller than that corresponding
to all married men. Given that the average entry rate is 2.34 for this group of men, we nd
that having one's own ESI as a policyholder leads to a 0.55 percentage point or a 23.5 percent
reduction in the rate of entry.
The results presented in columns 4-6 of Table 5 correspond to the probit estimates of
equation (2). The analysis includes SE men in period t and focuses on their decision to remain
SE versus exit into WS employment in period t+1. Column 4 presents to the specication for
all SE men while the next two columns disaggregate the sample according to marital status.
When we control for the spouses's employment status, we nd evidence of assortive mating.
To summarize the statistically signicant eects from column 4, SE men are more likely to
exit SE if they were born abroad, have more education, and if the relative earnings from SE
compared to those from WS employment (as predicted for period t+1) are lower. The inverse
Mills' ratio is again statistically signicant.
16The estimated coecients associated with individual and spousal HI are both negative
and statistically signicant in columns 4-6 of Table 5. Based on the estimated marginal eect
corresponding to OwnHI (see column 4), as expected, an individual is less likely to exit SE
if he is the policyholder of a private HI plan. The likelihood of exit from SE is reduced by
7.9 percentage points, all else equal. Considering that the average rate of exit is 29.2 percent,
this na ve estimate corresponds to a 27.2 percent reduction in the rate of exit from SE. The
eect of spousal ESI is quite large: an entrepreneur is 6.3 percentage points less likely to exit if
his wife is the policyholder of ESI. The estimated interaction term is positive but statistically
insignicant. As before, correcting the na ve estimate associated with OwnHI amounts to
summing together the marginal eects on SpHI and the interaction term. Doing so yields
an adjusted DD estimate of 0.9 percentage points or a three percent reduction in the rate of
exit from SE. The results presented in column 5 and 6 are similar to these. The corrected
DD estimates are larger in magnitude: 4.5 percent for the subsample of married men and 12.5
percent for the subsample of married men in dual-earner families, but the interaction term
never gains statistical signicance.
As discussed above, it is hard to argue that changes in an individual's own HI coverage
are orthogonal to changes in his spouse's HI status, especially for the SE. That being the case,
we exploit a dierent source of variation, namely the changes in the TRA86 HI tax deductions
for the SE, which introduced exogenous changes in the relative after-tax HI premium during
this period. Table 6 presents the results corresponding to the estimation of equations (3), (4),
and (5). Columns 1-3 correspond to the men who were WS at the baseline; we analyze whether
they chose to enter SE in period t + 1 or not. We nd positive and statistically signicant
eects of being born abroad and income from interest on the likelihood of entering SE.
In terms of the variable of interest, we nd a negative and statistically signicant eect
of the predicted relative after-tax HI premium on the probability of entering SE (see column
1). The marginal eect associated with RelPrem implies that if the relative premium were to
increase by one unit, the likelihood of entry would decrease by about 0.09 percentage points.
Based on the average relative after-tax HI premium (6.84 from Table 3) and the average rate
of entry (2.42 percent), a 15 percent increase in this relative price measure would decrease the
rate of entry into SE by 3.7 percent. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 break the sample down
by the ESI policy holding status. The relative after-tax premium loses statistical signicance
17when we consider the former subsample but remains negative and gains even more statistical
signicance for the latter. The associated marginal eect for the men without any ESI implies
a 0.56 percentage point reduction in the rate of entry into SE, which suggests a 9.5 percent
decline. As explained above, this reduction corresponds to a 15 percent rise in the relative
after-tax HI premium.
In column 4 of Table 6, we report the estimation results for equation (4) for the entire
sample of SE men. Being born abroad, having a graduate degree, higher predicted relative
earnings, and owning a home have statistically signicant eects on the rate of exit from
SE. The relative after-tax HI premium is statistically insignicant, however. Finally, the last
column in Table 6 presents the random-eects probit estimates of equation (5). The dependent
variable indicates whether a working man is SE or not (i.e. WS). Taking full advantage of the
panel nature of the ORG sample and controlling for individual-specic random eects produces
many statistically signicant eects. An individual is more likely to be SE if he is older, white,
born abroad, and less educated. In terms of the family characteristics, the likelihood of SE
is increased if this individual is not married, has more children, owns a home, and has lower
dividend income but more rental income. The coecient on the predicted relative earnings is
positive and statistically signicant. The variable of interest, the relative after-tax HI premium,
is negatively associated with the likelihood of being SE as expected, but this eect is statistically
insignicant.
5 Conclusions
The job-lock literature has shown that HI factors in
uence labor market mobility, at least
for certain groups of workers. Our paper draws its inspiration from this literature and attempts
to ll in the gap in terms of the role HI has on entrepreneurship. For this purpose, we examine
entries from WS employment into SE, exits from SE into WS jobs, as well as the likelihood
of being SE. We use two identication strategies in analyzing the role of HI. The rst focuses
on the eect of an individual's own HI status has in combination with alternative sources of
HI coverage (i.e. that through a spouse). We nd that both individual and spousal HI have
negative and statistically signicant eects on the likelihood of entry and exit. For WS men, the
corrected DD estimate implies that being the policyholder of one's own ESI decreases the rate
18of entry into SE by 18-34 percent. Among SE men, privately purchased individual HI decreases
the rate of exit by 3-13 percent, however, this nding is not statistically signicant. Second,
we exploit the exogenous nature of the TRA86 amendments which allowed SE entrepreneurs
to deduct their HI premiums from their taxable income. We nd that the relative after-tax HI
premium, between the SE and the WS, reduces entry into SE. Even for the subsample of WS
men who lack ESI, which produces the largest estimate, the eect is still rather small. The
relative after-tax premium never gains statistical signicance in the models of exit from SE and
the likelihood of being SE. This pattern is similar to that reported by Heim and Lurie (2008).
The sole instance in which we nd evidence that HI factors into the labor market transi-
tions from WS jobs into SE is in the DD framework which relies on variation in individual and
spousal ESI. All of our models that instead use the TRA86 amendments produce economically
insignicant estimates regardless of their statistical signicance. This pattern is consistent
with Gruber and Madrian's (2004) review of the job-lock literature as they largely attribute
the mixed ndings to the source of identication used. Papers using alternative sources of HI
as the means of identication tend to nd evidence in support of job-lock whereas models that
rely on other measures (e.g., individual/family health, medical expenses) do not. The changes
in the TRA86 tax deductions are arguably more exogenous than dierences in spousal HI.
Thus, we are more condent in these estimates. Note that the lack of response could also be
due to the diculties associated with obtaining private non-group HI above and beyond the
higher premiums. In an eort to \level the playing eld" between the WS and the SE, Congress
passed the TRA86, and its subsequent amendments, which enabled the SE to deduct their HI
premiums from their taxable income. However, even the full deductibility of HI premiums may
not compensate for high search costs, potential denial, exclusion restrictions on pre-existing
conditions, etc. in the private non-group market (Pauly and Nichols, 2002; Blumberg and
Nichols, 2004; Gumus and Regan, 2008).
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996) also nd limited to no response of the decision to enter SE to HI
factors. They point out that this nding may not be particularly surprising as the transition
to entrepreneurship involves substantial risks. The lack of HI coverage may be one of the
risks such individuals are willing to undertake and may not constitute a major impediment
in entry decisions. Note that even though Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996) use the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which
19follow individuals for longer periods than the CPS does, they still focus year-to-year labor
market transitions. They argue that the eects of HI will be greater in the short-run than
in the long-run. In this respect, the fact that the ORG in the CPS is a short panel does not
constitute a particular concern. A longer panel, however, would to some extent enable us to
address the duration of the SE enterprises.18 For example, the observed exits from SE may
be mostly for the newly formed SE ventures as they tend to be especially volatile in their
rst few years (e.g., see Evans and Leighton, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Taylor, 1999;
Bruce and Schuetze, 2004). Without further information on the nature of SE, it is dicult to
judge if such exits are undesirable or not. However, SE may merely be serving as a relatively
temporary state of employment enabling an individual to bridge two jobs. Although we control
for industry and occupation in our analysis, we do not have detailed information about the
nature of SE. Despite these shortcomings, the CPS does include detailed information on a
respondent's HI policyholder status, along with an opportunity to observe the labor market
transitions for a large sample of WS, and especially SE individuals. The job-lock literature
has attracted considerable attention to the WS population but entrepreneurial activity is an
important consideration as well. This paper serves as one of the rst steps in addressing the
importance of HI as it relates to entrepreneurship.
18The CPS does contain limited information on tenure for a subsample of the population contained in the
January (i.e. the Contingent Worker Supplement) and the February supplements (i.e. the Worker Supplement).
Merging our data with these supplements reduces our sample size drastically and introduces selection bias as it
requires a respondent to be in the survey on three separate occasions, rather than just two.
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 % remain % enter into
NW SS E
Period t
   WS 69,920 97.58 2.42
   WS;  own ESI policyholder 52,438 98.73 1.27
   WS;  not own ESI policyholder 17,482 94.14 5.86
   WS; spouse ESI policyholder
1 19,609 97.11 2.89
   WS; spouse not ESI policyholder
1 50,311 97.77 2.23
% remain % exit into
NS E W S
Period t
   SE 5,674 70.80 29.20
   SE;  own private HI policyholder 1,328 75.30 24.70
   SE;  not own private HI policyholder 4,346 69.42 30.58
   SE; spouse ESI policyholder
1 1,936 74.02 25.98
   SE; spouse not ESI policyholder
1 3,738 69.13 30.87
Table 1a: Transition patterns for WS men, 1995-2006
Period t+1
Table 1b: Transition patterns for SE men, 1995-2006
Period t+1
Notes: 
1Single individuals are included in the category of those who do not have spousal ESI.p-value
4
of the t-test
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. (2) vs (3)
Remain WS 0.976 0.154 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
Enter into SE 0.024 0.154 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 -
Individual characteristics
Age 41.934 9.128 41.905 9.127 43.066 9.112 0.000
Race/Ethnicity
White 0.883 0.321 0.883 0.322 0.898 0.303 0.059
Black 0.066 0.249 0.067 0.250 0.043 0.203 0.000
Other race 0.051 0.219 0.050 0.219 0.059 0.236 0.108
Hispanic 0.080 0.271 0.080 0.271 0.082 0.275 0.726
Born abroad 0.100 0.301 0.100 0.300 0.134 0.341 0.000
Education
Years of schooling 13.849 2.731 13.849 2.726 13.879 2.956 0.655
Less than high school 0.067 0.251 0.067 0.250 0.083 0.277 0.008
High school degree 0.316 0.465 0.316 0.465 0.319 0.466 0.807
Some college 0.270 0.444 0.270 0.444 0.238 0.426 0.003
Bachelor's degree 0.225 0.417 0.225 0.417 0.228 0.420 0.718
Graduate degree 0.122 0.328 0.122 0.328 0.132 0.338 0.232
Health status: excellent or very good 0.747 0.435 0.747 0.435 0.740 0.439 0.536
Family characteristics
Married 0.745 0.436 0.746 0.436 0.740 0.439 0.629
Number of children under age 18 0.935 1.153 0.935 1.152 0.943 1.197 0.785
Own home 0.822 0.382 0.822 0.382 0.820 0.385 0.771
Interest income (in 1,000s)
1 0.871 4.320 0.860 4.257 1.306 6.354 0.000
Dividend income (in 1,000s)
1 0.621 3.584 0.622 3.588 0.579 3.414 0.625
Rental income (in 1,000s)
1 0.335 3.730 0.330 3.711 0.551 4.436 0.016
Spouse characteristics
Spouse's labor market status
2
SE 0.045 0.206 0.044 0.205 0.069 0.253 0.000
WS 0.747 0.435 0.748 0.434 0.704 0.457 0.000
NW 0.208 0.406 0.208 0.406 0.228 0.419 0.084
Spouse ESI policyholder
2 0.376 0.484 0.374 0.484 0.453 0.498 0.000
Job characteristics
Industry
Construction 0.107 0.309 0.104 0.305 0.238 0.426 0.000
Manufacturing 0.219 0.413 0.222 0.416 0.081 0.273 0.000
Trade 0.159 0.366 0.159 0.366 0.159 0.366 0.984
Services 0.268 0.443 0.266 0.442 0.326 0.469 0.000
Other industries 0.247 0.432 0.249 0.432 0.195 0.396 0.000
Occupation
Managerial and professional 0.379 0.485 0.379 0.485 0.374 0.484 0.668
Blue collar 0.378 0.485 0.378 0.485 0.389 0.488 0.337
Other occupations 0.242 0.429 0.243 0.429 0.237 0.425 0.566
Relative earnings 1.054 0.222 1.054 0.222 1.060 0.221 0.267
Own ESI policyholder 0.750 0.433 0.759 0.428 0.394 0.489 0.000
Relative after-tax HI premium 6.791 1.737 6.791 1.737 6.779 1.738 0.783
SE after-tax HI premium (in 1,000s)
1,3 2.971 0.538 2.971 0.538 2.957 0.529 0.278
WS after-tax HI premium (in 1,000s)
1,3 0.463 0.136 0.463 0.136 0.463 0.138 0.871
N
Table 2: Baseline descriptive statistics for the WS men (probit sample)
(1) (2) (3)
All Remain WS Enter into SE
69,920 68,229
Notes: 
1All $ figures are expressed in constant 2006 US$.  
2Means for spousal characteristics are conditional on being married.
the t-statistic refer to the test of differences in means between those who remain WS and those who enter SE.
1,691




Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. (2) vs (3)
Remain SE 0.708 0.455 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
Exit into WS 0.292 0.455 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 -
Individual characteristics
Age 44.529 8.694 45.016 8.515 43.349 9.007 0.000
Race/Ethnicity
White 0.920 0.271 0.928 0.259 0.902 0.297 0.001
Black 0.030 0.172 0.026 0.160 0.040 0.197 0.005
Other race 0.049 0.216 0.046 0.209 0.057 0.233 0.068
Hispanic 0.064 0.244 0.059 0.236 0.075 0.264 0.021
Born abroad 0.094 0.292 0.084 0.278 0.119 0.324 0.000
Education
Years of schooling 13.791 2.943 13.678 2.919 14.066 2.983 0.000
Less than high school 0.084 0.277 0.089 0.285 0.069 0.254 0.013
High school degree 0.330 0.470 0.339 0.473 0.309 0.462 0.029
Some college 0.261 0.439 0.264 0.441 0.253 0.435 0.380
Bachelor's degree 0.195 0.396 0.187 0.390 0.212 0.409 0.029
Graduate degree 0.131 0.337 0.120 0.325 0.156 0.363 0.000
Health status: excellent or very good 0.737 0.440 0.737 0.440 0.737 0.440 0.978
Family characteristics
Married 0.762 0.426 0.768 0.422 0.747 0.435 0.081
Number of children under age 18 0.938 1.205 0.926 1.199 0.967 1.221 0.243
Own home 0.854 0.353 0.865 0.341 0.828 0.377 0.000
Interest income (in 1,000s)
1 0.973 4.604 0.980 4.461 0.958 4.936 0.869
Dividend income (in 1,000s)
1 0.628 3.565 0.594 3.413 0.709 3.909 0.267
Rental income (in 1,000s)
1 0.818 5.591 0.855 5.687 0.728 5.351 0.437
Spouse characteristics
Spouse's labor market status
2
SE 0.173 0.378 0.179 0.384 0.158 0.365 0.090
WS 0.624 0.484 0.630 0.483 0.610 0.488 0.090
NW 0.203 0.402 0.191 0.393 0.233 0.423 0.002
Spouse ESI policyholder
2 0.448 0.497 0.464 0.499 0.407 0.491 0.001
Job characteristics
Industry
Construction 0.303 0.460 0.326 0.469 0.248 0.432 0.000
Manufacturing 0.049 0.215 0.050 0.218 0.045 0.208 0.447
Trade 0.125 0.331 0.119 0.324 0.139 0.346 0.043
Services 0.365 0.482 0.354 0.478 0.393 0.489 0.005
Other industries 0.158 0.365 0.151 0.358 0.174 0.380 0.030
Occupation
Managerial and professional 0.376 0.484 0.400 0.490 0.366 0.482 0.000
Blue collar 0.411 0.492 0.366 0.482 0.430 0.495 0.018
Other occupations 0.213 0.410 0.235 0.424 0.204 0.403 0.010
Relative earnings 1.045 0.211 1.038 0.210 1.062 0.213 0.000
Own private HI policyholder 0.234 0.423 0.249 0.432 0.198 0.399 0.000
Relative after-tax HI premium 6.839 1.784 6.879 1.825 6.739 1.677 0.007
SE after-tax HI premium (in 1,000s)
1,3 2.964 0.542 2.967 0.544 2.957 0.538 0.505
WS after-tax HI premium (in 1,000s)
1,3 0.460 0.139 0.459 0.141 0.463 0.134 0.313
N
Table 3: Baseline descriptive statistics for the SE men (probit sample)
(1) (2) (3)
All Remain SE Exit into WS
5,674 4,017 1,657
Notes: 
1All $ figures are expressed in constant 2006 US$.  
2Means for spousal characteristics are conditional on being married.
3These variables do not correspond to the baseline but to the predictions for the second period as described in the text.  
4p-values of
the t-statistic refer to the test of differences in means between those who remain SE and those who exit into WS.p-value
4
of the t-test
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. (2) vs (3)
WS 0.925 0.263 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
SE 0.075 0.263 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 -
Individual characteristics
Age 42.128 9.122 41.934 9.128 44.529 8.694 0.000
Race/Ethnicity
White 0.886 0.318 0.883 0.321 0.920 0.271 0.000
Black 0.064 0.244 0.066 0.249 0.030 0.172 0.000
Other race 0.051 0.219 0.051 0.219 0.049 0.216 0.620
Hispanic 0.079 0.269 0.080 0.271 0.064 0.244 0.000
Born abroad 0.100 0.300 0.100 0.301 0.094 0.292 0.136
Education
Years of schooling 13.845 2.748 13.849 2.731 13.791 2.943 0.125
Less than high school 0.069 0.253 0.067 0.251 0.084 0.277 0.000
High school degree 0.317 0.465 0.316 0.465 0.330 0.470 0.026
Some college 0.269 0.443 0.270 0.444 0.261 0.439 0.156
Bachelor's degree 0.222 0.416 0.225 0.417 0.195 0.396 0.000
Graduate degree 0.123 0.329 0.122 0.328 0.131 0.337 0.067
Health status: excellent or very good 0.746 0.435 0.747 0.435 0.737 0.440 0.109
Family characteristics
Married 0.747 0.435 0.745 0.436 0.762 0.426 0.006
Number of children under age 18 0.935 1.157 0.935 1.153 0.938 1.205 0.840
Own home 0.825 0.380 0.822 0.382 0.854 0.353 0.000
Interest income (in 1,000s)
1 0.879 4.342 0.871 4.320 0.973 4.604 0.088
Dividend income (in 1,000s)
1 0.622 3.583 0.621 3.584 0.628 3.565 0.896
Rental income (in 1,000s)
1 0.371 3.903 0.335 3.730 0.818 5.591 0.000
Spouse characteristics
Spouse's labor market status
2
SE 0.054 0.227 0.045 0.206 0.173 0.378 0.000
WS 0.738 0.440 0.747 0.435 0.624 0.484 0.000
NW 0.208 0.406 0.208 0.406 0.203 0.402 0.418
Spouse ESI policyholder
2 0.382 0.486 0.376 0.484 0.448 0.497 0.000
Job characteristics
Industry
Construction 0.122 0.327 0.107 0.309 0.303 0.460 0.000
Manufacturing 0.206 0.404 0.219 0.413 0.049 0.215 0.000
Trade 0.157 0.364 0.159 0.366 0.125 0.331 0.000
Services 0.275 0.447 0.268 0.443 0.365 0.482 0.000
Other industries 0.241 0.428 0.247 0.432 0.158 0.365 0.000
Occupation
Managerial and professional 0.379 0.485 0.379 0.485 0.376 0.484 0.655
Blue collar 0.380 0.485 0.378 0.485 0.411 0.492 0.000
Other occupations 0.240 0.427 0.242 0.429 0.213 0.410 0.000
Relative earnings 1.043 0.234 1.044 0.235 1.038 0.222 0.070
Own ESI policyholder 0.709 0.454 0.750 0.433 - - -
Own private HI policyholder 0.057 0.232 - - 0.234 0.423 -
Relative after-tax HI premium 6.948 1.830 6.943 1.829 7.009 1.841 0.009
SE after-tax HI premium (in 1,000s)
1,3 2.875 0.522 2.876 0.521 2.871 0.524 0.516
WS after-tax HI premium (in 1,000s)
1,3 0.439 0.129 0.439 0.129 0.435 0.130 0.019
N
Table 4: Baseline descriptive statistics for all working men (random-effects probit sample)
(1) (2) (3)
All WS SE
3These variables do not correspond to the baseline but to the predictions for the second period as described in the text.  
4p-values of
the t-statistic refer to the test of differences in means between between those who are WS versus SE.
75,594 69,920 5,674
Notes: 
1All $ figures are expressed in constant 2006 US$.  
2Means for spousal characteristics are conditional on being married.All WS men Married WS men Married WS men in  All SE men Married SE men Married SE men in 
dual-earner families dual-earner families
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own HI policyholder
1  -0.7358***  -0.7769***  -0.7466***    -0.2527***    -0.2725***    -0.2312***
           (0.0296)    (0.0384)    (0.0475)      (0.0498)      (0.0620)      (0.0752)   
 [-0.0544]  [-0.0587]  [-0.0539]  [-0.0794]  [-0.0841]  [-0.0704]
Spouse ESI policyholder  -0.1794***  -0.1531***  -0.1378***    -0.1957***    -0.2234***    -0.2274***
           (0.0359)    (0.0416)    (0.0465)      (0.0468)      (0.0557)      (0.0592)   
 [-0.0087]  [-0.0076]  [-0.0069]  [-0.0628]  [-0.0716]  [-0.0727]
Own HI policyholder
1 ×   0.2221***   0.2669***   0.2234***     0.1595        0.1742        0.1173   
                 Spouse ESI policyholder (0.0493)    (0.0551)    (0.0625)      (0.1313)      (0.1370)      (0.1475)   
  [0.0131]   [0.0157]   [0.0124]   [0.0540]   [0.0586]   [0.0384]
{0.0202} {0.0206} {0.0172} {0.0541} {0.0594} {0.0420}
Age   0.0088     -0.0271*    -0.0440**     -0.0329       -0.0151       -0.0243   
           (0.0124)    (0.0154)    (0.0174)      (0.0231)      (0.0287)      (0.0327)   
  [0.0002]  [-0.0064]  [-0.0154]  [-0.0089]  [-0.0057]  [-0.0084]
Age squared  -0.4403      3.2195*     4.9918***     2.6975        0.9418        1.8684   
           (1.3973)    (1.7171)    (1.9351)      (2.4822)      (3.0523)      (3.4727)   
 [-0.0228]   [0.1649]   [0.2512]   [0.8814]   [0.3043]   [0.5941]
Black  -0.1355**   -0.0627     -0.0616        0.0793        0.1580        0.2906   
(0.0663)    (0.0839)    (0.0962)      (0.1380)      (0.1663)      (0.1852)   
 [-0.0063]  [-0.0031]  [-0.0030]   [0.0264]   [0.0530]   [0.0988]
Hispanic  -0.0860     -0.0612     -0.0815       -0.0998        0.0092       -0.0202   
           (0.0613)    (0.0730)    (0.0867)      (0.1127)      (0.1296)      (0.1520)   
 [-0.0042]  [-0.0030]  [-0.0038]  [-0.0318]   [0.0030]  [-0.0064]
Born abroad   0.1139***   0.1292***   0.1467***     0.1340*       0.0932        0.0549   
           (0.0399)    (0.0463)    (0.0550)      (0.0714)      (0.0827)      (0.0999)   
  [0.0064]   [0.0073]   [0.0082]   [0.0450]   [0.0307]   [0.0177]
High school degree   0.1014**    0.0570      0.0439        0.0944        0.1875*       0.2030*  
(0.0491)    (0.0609)    (0.0729)      (0.0810)      (0.0994)      (0.1193)   
  [0.0054]   [0.0030]   [0.0022]   [0.0311]   [0.0615]   [0.0657]
Some college   0.1011*    -0.0265     -0.0836        0.0813        0.1618        0.2271   
(0.0560)    (0.0718)    (0.0848)      (0.0937)      (0.1192)      (0.1389)   
  [0.0055]  [-0.0013]  [-0.0041]   [0.0268]   [0.0533]   [0.0742]
Bachelor's degree   0.1770***   0.0733      0.0009        0.1363        0.2389*       0.2608*  
(0.0620)    (0.0778)    (0.0912)      (0.1050)      (0.1306)      (0.1500)   
  [0.0100]   [0.0039]   [0.0000]   [0.0454]   [0.0800]   [0.0863]
Graduate degree   0.1408**    0.1999**    0.1638*       0.4508***     0.4683***     0.4078***
           (0.0706)    (0.0816)    (0.0973)      (0.1166)      (0.1321)      (0.1568)   
  [0.0080]   [0.0117]   [0.0092]   [0.1577]   [0.1624]   [0.1392]
Relative earnings
2   0.1174     -0.2289     -0.3139*      -0.3897**     -0.2173       -0.0395   
           (0.0962)    (0.1558)    (0.1863)      (0.1786)      (0.2698)      (0.3117)   
  [0.0061]  [-0.0117]  [-0.0158]  [-0.1273]  [-0.0702]  [-0.0125]
Married  -0.0105    - -     0.0319    - -
(0.0335)                              (0.0549)                               
 [-0.0005]                         [0.0104]                      
Number of children under age 18   0.0032      0.0064      0.0021        0.0076        0.0076       -0.0028   
(0.0124)    (0.0136)    (0.0159)      (0.0205)      (0.0224)      (0.0261)   
  [0.0002]   [0.0003]   [0.0001]   [0.0025]   [0.0025]  [-0.0009]
Own home   0.0518      0.0687      0.0600       -0.0810       -0.1465**     -0.1248   
(0.0317)    (0.0428)    (0.0508)      (0.0543)      (0.0723)      (0.0870)   
  [0.0026]   [0.0034]   [0.0029]  [-0.0269]  [-0.0487]  [-0.0408]
Interest income (in 1,000s)
3   0.0069***   0.0057**    0.0034       -0.0021       -0.0020        0.0006   
(0.0020)    (0.0025)    (0.0031)      (0.0041)      (0.0046)      (0.0052)   
  [0.0004]   [0.0003]   [0.0002]  [-0.0007]  [-0.0007]   [0.0002]
Dividend income (in 1,000s)
3  -0.0037     -0.0046     -0.0066        0.0053        0.0047        0.0071   
(0.0033)    (0.0038)    (0.0049)      (0.0051)      (0.0061)      (0.0067)   
 [-0.0002]  [-0.0002]  [-0.0003]   [0.0017]   [0.0015]   [0.0023]
Rental income (in 1,000s)
3   0.0035      0.0035      0.0036       -0.0024       -0.0084*      -0.0093*  
           (0.0024)    (0.0028)    (0.0032)      (0.0034)      (0.0044)      (0.0048)   
  [0.0002]   [0.0002]   [0.0002]  [-0.0008]  [-0.0027]  [-0.0030]
Spouse SE -   0.1925***   0.2902*** -    -0.1407**     -0.1235*  
                       (0.0600)    (0.0568)                    (0.0704)      (0.0647)   
             [0.0115]   [0.0184]             [-0.0443]  [-0.0384]
Spouse WS -  -0.0972*** - -    -0.0163    -
           (0.0353)                  (0.0617)                 
            [-0.0052]                        [-0.0053]           
Inverse Mills' ratio
4   1.2260**    1.2256**    1.4167**      0.5112*       0.3883        0.3486   
           (0.5084)    (0.5883)    (0.6586)      (0.2935)      (0.3348)      (0.3710)   
  [0.0634]   [0.0628]   [0.0713]   [0.1670]   [0.1255]   [0.1109]
Pseudo R-squared 0.106 0.110 0.107 0.046 0.048 0.046
Log-likelihood -7,119.70 -5,255.28 -4,094.44 -3,269.74 -2,464.51 -1,935.82
N 69,919 52,122 41,277 5,674 4,323 3,446
Average rate of entry/exit 2.42% 2.40% 2.34% 29.20% 28.61% 27.54%
1-3 and to privately purchased HI plans in columns 4-6.  
2These variables do not correspond to the baseline but to the predictions for the second period as described in the text.  
3All $ figures
are expressed in constant 2006 US$.  
4The inverse Mills' ratio to IMRWS in columns 1-3 and to IMRSE in columns 4-6 as described in the text.
ENTRY EXIT
Table 5: Effect of health insurance on entry and exit; probit results (DD)
are non-Hispanic whites, less than high school degree, and spouse NW.  * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 1%.  
1Own HI policyholder status refers to ESI in columns
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses and marginal effects in brackets.  The marginal effects on the interaction term that are calculated using the Ai and Norton
(2003) method is reported in braces.  Each model also includes a constant term, state- and year-effects as well as industry and occupation dummies which are not reported.  Excluded categoriesEXIT SE
Estimation method: Probit RE probit
All WS men WS men with ESI WS men without ESI All SE men All men
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative after-tax HI premium
1  -0.0164*     0.0037     -0.0508***    -0.0244    -0.0020
           (0.0095)    (0.0134)    (0.0146)      (0.0156)    (0.0083)
 [-0.0009]   [0.0001]  [-0.0056]  [-0.0080] [-0.0000]
Age  -0.0017      0.0080      0.0014       -0.0358    0.0612***
           (0.0120)    (0.0184)    (0.0171)      (0.0231)    (0.0112)
 [-0.0001]   [0.0001]   [0.0001]  [-0.0086] [0.0003]
Age squared   0.6546      0.0219      0.1150        3.1265    -3.4086***
           (1.3545)    (2.0547)    (1.9552)      (2.4762)    (1.2888)
  [0.0355]   [0.0007]   [0.0127]   [1.0267] [-0.0190]
Black  -0.1024     -0.2078**   -0.0757        0.0723    -0.5457***
(0.0640)    (0.1023)    (0.0897)      (0.1380)    (0.0545)
 [-0.0051]  [-0.0054]  [-0.0080]   [0.0242] [-0.0016]
Hispanic  -0.0500     -0.1779*     0.0206       -0.0912    -0.3186***
           (0.0591)    (0.0966)    (0.0827)      (0.1125)    (0.0474)
 [-0.0026]  [-0.0047]   [0.0023]  [-0.0293] [-0.0012]
Born abroad   0.1854***   0.1559***   0.0971*       0.1484**  0.1152***
           (0.0383)    (0.0592)    (0.0545)      (0.0710)    (0.0394)
  [0.0116]   [0.0056]   [0.0113]   [0.0502] [0.0007]
High school degree   0.0053      0.0143      0.1512**      0.0719    -0.0585
(0.0473)    (0.0879)    (0.0609)      (0.0808)    (0.0443)
  [0.0003]   [0.0005]   [0.0173]   [0.0237] [-0.0003]
Some college  -0.0190     -0.0604      0.2289***     0.0470    -0.1174**
(0.0539)    (0.0962)    (0.0718)      (0.0934)    (0.0482)
 [-0.0010]  [-0.0018]   [0.0275]   [0.0155] [-0.0006]
Bachelor's degree   0.0349      0.0278      0.2731***     0.0894    -0.2549***
(0.0599)    (0.1019)    (0.0831)      (0.1046)    (0.0506)
  [0.0019]   [0.0009]   [0.0344]   [0.0298] [-0.0012]
Graduate degree  -0.0053      0.0258      0.1850*       0.4155*** -0.3537***
           (0.0684)    (0.1110)    (0.0999)      (0.1163)    (0.0590)
 [-0.0003]   [0.0008]   [0.0229]   [0.1455] [-0.0014]
Relative earnings
1   0.0584      0.0674      0.1883       -0.3799**  0.1893**
           (0.0939)    (0.1449)    (0.1358)      (0.1784)    (0.0899)
  [0.0032]   [0.0021]   [0.0208]  [-0.1248] [0.0011]
Married  -0.0423     -0.0813*    -0.0186       -0.0255    -0.1058***
(0.0295)    (0.0446)    (0.0432)      (0.0509)    (0.0282)
 [-0.0023]  [-0.0027]  [-0.0021]  [-0.0084] [-0.0006]
Number of children under age 18   0.0063      0.0237     -0.0140        0.0197    0.0500***
(0.0119)    (0.0174)    (0.0177)      (0.0203)    (0.0104)
  [0.0003]   [0.0007]  [-0.0015]   [0.0065] [0.0003]
Own home  -0.0089      0.0842*     0.0074       -0.1130**  0.1258***
(0.0303)    (0.0499)    (0.0414)      (0.0539)    (0.0295)
 [-0.0005]   [0.0025]   [0.0008]  [-0.0379] [0.0006]
Interest income (in 1,000s)
2   0.0062***   0.0076***   0.0053       -0.0020    -0.0022
(0.0020)    (0.0024)    (0.0036)      (0.0041)    (0.0020)
  [0.0003]   [0.0002]   [0.0006]  [-0.0007] [-0.0000]
Dividend income (in 1,000s)
2  -0.0053     -0.0043     -0.0016        0.0046    -0.0053**
(0.0033)    (0.0040)    (0.0060)      (0.0051)    (0.0025)
 [-0.0003]  [-0.0001]  [-0.0002]   [0.0015] [-0.0000]
Rental income (in 1,000s)
2   0.0036      0.0023      0.0046       -0.0030    0.0099***
           (0.0024)    (0.0032)    (0.0039)      (0.0034)    (0.0017)
  [0.0002]   [0.0001]   [0.0005]  [-0.0010] [0.0001]
Inverse Mills' ratio
3   1.0804**    0.1357      2.3343***     0.5461*   -
           (0.4918)    (0.7084)    (0.7440)      (0.2929)   
  [0.0585]   [0.0043]   [0.2583]   [0.1793]
Pseudo R-squared 0.056 0.053 0.060 0.041 0.108
Log-likelihood -7,517.58 -3,380.63 -3,667.85 -3,285.55 -29,874.16
N 69,919 52,438 17,481 5,674 75,593
Average rate of entry/exit/SE 2.42% 1.27% 5.86% 29.20% 7.53%
Table 6: Effect of relative after-tax HI premium on entry, exit, and the likelihood of being SE
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses and marginal effects in brackets.  Each model also includes a constant term, state- and year-effects as well as 
industry and occupation dummies which are not reported. Excluded categories are non-Hispanic whites and less than high school degree.  * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%.  
1These variables do not correspond to the baseline but to the predictions for the second period as described in the text.  
2All $ figures are expressed in constant
2006 US$.  
3The inverse Mills' ratio corresponds to IMRWS in columns 1-3 and to IMRSE in column 4 as described in the text.
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